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DDI-3031-73

24 April 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Hall on Peripheral Reconnaissance

1. In response to the Director's instruction, I met with Dr. Hall and General Davidson on 23 April to discuss the new DoD review of peripheral reconnaissance. Dr. Hall said that with a new Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense it seemed appropriate to review the matter once again.

2. Dr. Hall recounted some of the changes that had taken place in peripheral reconnaissance over the past few years and indicated that some additional cuts were possible. In reply to my question, he said that he did not see any great cost savings coming out of this exercise. He said most of the cost of the routine flights were not charged to the intelligence budget and that he did not contemplate a cut in the aircraft assigned. Rather, he judged that some of the present equipment (e.g., the EC 121s) should be replaced with better equipment.

3. I raised the question of operational requirements and made the following points:

--The routine flights for radar order of battle and air defense information were fundamentally based on commanders' need for information so that they would be able to implement their operational responsibilities.

--The operational requirements had been generated with little or no regard for the impact on intelligence resources.

--It would seem appropriate to review these operational requirements to see if they could be reformulated so as to reduce the level of peripheral reconnaissance.

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--It might be possible to formulate operational requirements so that they reflect changing probabilities of the need for implementation and thus have a more flexible and responsive peripheral reconnaissance program.

4. Dr. Hall said that he doubted that commanders actually conceived of a direct functional relationship between his operational requirements and the number of peripheral flights. He said that the number of flights was as much a function of the need for training as the need for intelligence. For these reasons he did not intend to initiate a review of operational requirements. After some discussion, Dr. Hall conceded that if the commanders tied the number of flights to their operational requirements, he might probe this aspect further with them.

5. It appears to me that this review will be much like earlier studies resulting in some reductions in the number of peripheral flights, mainly for the routine collection of information on order of battle and air defense. In addition, Dr. Hall said that there would be a greater effort to shift some of the tasking for the routine collection of ELINT and COMINT from peripheral reconnaissance to satellites.

6. The meeting ended with Dr. Hall inviting our participation in the study. I accepted the invitation and said that he should call me when he was ready to start.



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Deputy Director for Intelligence

DDI/EWProctor/ks (24 Apr 1973)

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Monday, 23 April 1973

1430 hours

*Hall meeting!*

Programs and their levels are the result of:

1. Requirements of field commanders to be able to implement their operational responsibilities.
  - .need data on what is to be faced and how it operates
  - .Need for warning information about threatening activities
  - .Need for training to obtain the information
  - .Availability of resources to collect this information.
2. Requirements of the services to understand weapons of potential enemies in order to design US systems and tactics to counter them.
3. Requirements at all levels to acquire information about what's going on in potentially hostile countries.

Discussion

1. Operational requirements of field commanders have been generated with little or no regard for the impact they have on intelligence resources or activities.
  - .If commander is to be ready at all times, current level is probably not sufficient, unless we take into account the probability that he will have to react. With consideration of probability, it's probably too much.
  - Should be a review of the operational requirement to see whether they can be restated so that impact on intelligence reduced.
  - Problem is to design operational requirements that can reflect changing probability through time.
    - .To turn on at full force when need arises (Political--in time of crisis we turn off)

.With given resources at commands disposal and need to train, activity tends to use available resources ~~taxes~~ to maintain skills and collect.

2. Counter weapons and measures should be very selective and terminated when objective met.
3. Other sources should be used primarily for information about what's going on in potentially hostile but quiet countries.

Packard Memo

- to reduce risk and level
  - .New procedures to plan and assess, and to control and protect.
  - .Reassessed all missions--some eliminated, other redundant dropped--some platforms dropped entirely.
- Major reassessment in process--should move to less risky means of collection.
- Management by exception out..now require positive judgment on each.
- National Requirements--look to USIB for validity and priority.
- Command Requirements--insure that command judgment happen in the short run.
  - .Also deliberate long term assessment of requirements.

FUTURE

- .Some risk must be accepted.
- .Need to shake down intel requirements to acceptable levels.
- .Need measurement from intelligence community on the value and priority of requirements.
- .Must focus intel collection on indicators of risk, especially political.

Dineen Study

- JCS has responsibility to react (war)
- Services to prepare, train, build, etc.
- .JRC, can't question objectives of CINCs and Services--neither can DCI, State who judge risk.

Need new methods to assess value--to balance value, objectives, alternative means, risk, costs vulnerability--present data on each not comparable. Assessment does not consider the difference between risk and value existing between combat and peace. -transition to war difficult. may not be available

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. detailed review of specific programs--in context of objectives that drive it--these must be questioned. effectiveness to meet objectives, costs, risk, and alternatives.
2. Abolish existing mechanism for direction-- SICR and IROL--convert to guidance documents. .Should assign specific responsibility rather than broadcast requests to all collectors. .Should be accompanied with funding authority. (bidding system possible)
3. Extensive TESTS of our reaction capabilities.
4. fundamental changes in delegation of responsibility and authority ~~IA&Y~~ JCS, OSD & DCI levels.???
5. Specific Programs review (#1)
  - Berlin corridor, Cuba, ELINT for Sac, Imagery of NK.
  - Also Navy VQ squadrons and ACRP later.

Discussion:

Costing difficult: training vs intelligence  
Against cut and see.  
Difficult to evaluate risk vs number of flights  
Change may be more important.

Dineen-Tab A--Evaluation procedure

- Suggests "nets"--start with program, move in both directions--up to objectives, down to end results.
- Define objectives so the results can be measured.
- Uses, who will respond to the information and how? timing, frequency, processing, reporting.

Needs--Rare event::new signals, preparation for war  
--routine: update OB etc.

--Rare event depends on probability which depends on platform, orbit, crew, significance of area.

--Routine tied to effect on contingency plans. must ask how data is used and frequently updated.

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